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Introduction 
1 These were mid- to senior-level public officials from a wide range of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America identified by 
academics and practitioners as supportive of transparency and accountability reforms, and drawn from a pool who attended the 
GPSA Global Annual Forum in Washington DC, 2016. For further details, see Joshi and McCluskey (unpublished).
Despite the recent increase of empirical research and conceptual development in 
transparency and accountability (Fox 2015; Grandvoinnet, Aslam and Raha 2015; Joshi 
2013), much of this has been on the side of citizen action, looking at why and how 
citizens mobilise around accountability demands and at what makes their actions 
successful. Comparatively, there has been much less work exploring the state side 
of the equation – to explain why and how public officials respond (or not) to citizen 
demands for accountability. There are a series of reasons why our understanding of 
responsiveness is limited, namely:
• the difficulty of clarifying which factors, among the multitude that shape bureaucratic 
behaviour, are likely to dominate in certain contexts 
• the lack of resources and accessibility when conducting systematic research into 
bureaucracies and their responsiveness
• the difficulty of separating capacity and willingness when looking at bureaucrats’ 
responsiveness.
The aim of this research briefing is to highlight some of the more prominent issues 
related to bureaucratic responsiveness, particularly in relation to a ‘willingness to 
respond’. We review the relevant literature on public sector responsiveness, and use a 
set of interviews with ‘reformists’ within government1 to make three contributions. 
First, we present a simple framework for thinking about the conflicting pressures 
that public officials face in their work which shape how likely they are to respond to 
citizens’ demands. 
Second, we argue that the way that public officials see citizens and their claims (in 
terms of legitimacy, credibility and level of trust) directly influences their willingness 
to respond to citizen claims. 
Finally, we show that if and when public officials are willing to respond to citizens, 
they make use of their political and social capital to devise a series of strategies to 
mobilise responsiveness within the state through what we call bureaucraft: the art of 
manoeuvring diplomatically within complex organisational and individual incentives 
that pervade state bureaucracies – in other words, the bureaucratic equivalent of 
statecraft.
• Government responsiveness and accountability
• Reformist bureaucrats and willingness to respond
• Incentives for government reform
Key themes
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Note: Grey shading indicates possible embeddedness of public officials in the various groups; positions in the diagram suggest possible power over 
public officials.
Figure 1: Four sets of pressures for public officials to respond
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Pressures for bureaucrats to respond: 
A simple framework
Several scholars have recently attempted to unpack 
state responsiveness to citizens’ demands. Blair 
(2011) identifies a spectrum of state support 
for citizen-led accountability, from repression, to 
passivity, to enthusiastic support. Bryer (2007) 
categorises responsiveness by the stakeholders to 
which they feel they should respond, leading to six 
variants of bureaucratic responsiveness (dictated, 
constrained, purposive, entrepreneurial, collaborative 
and negotiated). Loureiro, Cassim, Darko, Katera and 
Salome (2016), making use of four cases of state 
responsiveness, distinguish between state hearing 
(registering voice without responsiveness – a one-way 
flow), state listening (two-way dialogue, but one-
way action) and state concerting (two-way dialogue 
resulting in joint action). Finally, Lodenstein, Dieleman, 
Gerretsen and Broerse (2016) offer a simpler schema by 
categorising responsiveness in three types: receptivity 
(indicating changes in attitudes of providers towards 
citizen groups); responsiveness (indicating changes in 
behaviour by taking concrete action to improve service 
provision in line with citizen concerns); and relations 
(indicating changes in accountability relations between 
communities and service providers). In this brief, we go 
one step further and focus on an essential actor within 
the state, namely the bureaucrat or public official.
A key claim of the literature on public officials’ 
responsiveness has been that due to resource 
constraints, public officials not only have considerable 
discretion on whether to respond to citizen needs, but 
also on how to respond (Lipsky 1980). Public officials 
also determine the legitimacy of demands from various 
stakeholders which means that they have significant 
degrees of discretion regarding who they could be 
responsive to. The question is: what factors determine 
how public officials use this discretion to be responsive?
Two sets of theories are useful in answering this 
question: ideas about personal motivations within the 
public sector; and theories about different pressures 
within the environment that are likely to affect the 
behaviour of individual public officials. Within the first 
set of theories, the key point to bear in mind is that 
public officials come with a diversity of motivations that 
can gain traction at various points of time, regardless 
of whether individual public officials are driven by ideas 
of public service, by other motivations such as personal 
profit, or a combination of both. Further, motivations 
are not static; they can and do change over time and 
through experience which links motivation, action 
and outcomes. Within the second set of theories, we 
highlight several factors that shape behaviour either 
internal to organisations or related to power exerted by 
other actors over bureaucrats (see Grandvoinnet, Aslam 
and Raha 2015; Lodenstein et al. 2016).
In Figure 1 we propose a simple framework to help 
structure how these different factors might affect 
the behaviour of public officials. At the centre of the 
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The extent to which pressure from citizens is effective depends upon explicit 
and implicit demands, and formal and informal mechanisms.
figure is the public official, surrounded by four kinds 
of pressures that pull and push in different directions: 
from within the bureaucracy (organisational); from 
peers (professional); from outside the organisation 
(elites); and from rights-holders affected by policies 
(citizens). At different points in time, public officials 
navigate these complex pressures depending on 
their main objectives, on how much space they have 
to operate within, on the overall motivations and 
incentives at play, and on whether these pressures 
work in similar or different directions.
Four caveats are, in order: first, these groups often 
can and do overlap; second, pressures from these 
groups can be both formal and informal and can 
even be contradictory; third, from the point of view 
of responsiveness to citizens, these pressures can be 
either positive or negative; and fourth, public officials 
are embedded in all these groups to different degrees, 
through kinship, social, professional, political and / or 
economic ties.
In organisational and bureaucratic pressures, 
we are mainly emphasising issues internal to the 
organisation. These pressures can either be formal (the 
organisational rules and structures which guide public 
officials’ everyday activities, broadly delineating what 
they can or cannot do), or informal (the values, beliefs 
and networks that shape how they behave within 
their organisations). In the case of formal pressures, 
rules and structures are inherent to public officials’ 
behaviour – through training and socialisation – making 
them more accountable to bureaucratic hierarchies 
rather than citizens’ demands. Of the informal 
pressures that guide public officials’ behaviour and can 
promote or prevent downward accountability, the most 
salient notion is that of positive organisational culture 
– the social, moral and symbolic incentives that can 
create an atmosphere where doing the right thing is 
expected and is the norm.
By professional pressures we mean the professional 
bodies to which public officials belong, as well as 
communities of practice that go beyond the public 
bureaucracy (e.g. doctors, teachers, engineers, 
managers). These professional bodies are potential 
sources of reform. However, they often impose 
unrealistic entry standards and barriers. At the same 
time, they may also turn a blind eye to enforcing 
professional ethics. There are exceptions, however, 
such as when professional associations play a role 
in advancing progressive and responsive agendas 
(Dowbor and Houtzager 2014; Joshi 1999), or when 
public officials absorb international ideas and ‘best 
practices’ through their professional fields.
In attempts to retain the status quo, pressures from 
elites often prevent responsiveness to citizens. These 
include pressures to allocate resources to specific 
groups (as political patronage), to divert them from 
pro-poor distribution, or simply not to implement rules 
and regulations that negatively affect the elite. There 
are a series of reasons why public officials give in to 
elite pressures: fear of power that these elites have to 
influence decisions that are important to public officials 
such as transfers and promotions (Wade 1985), or 
not wanting to challenge elites due to political reprisal 
(Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Veron 2005), 
or being risk-averse, or having limited capacities to 
read local contexts and power relations. At both local 
and higher levels, public officials are usually part 
of the prevailing political order and concerned with 
maintaining their status and position.
The focus of this brief is the final set of pressures 
emerging from below through citizen action that seeks 
responsiveness from public officials. The extent to 
which pressure from citizens is effective depends upon 
explicit and implicit demands and formal and informal 
mechanisms. Public officials filter pressures from below 
through different lenses, especially the extent to which 
the other three sets of pressures are for or against any 
inclination towards responsiveness. Such claims are 
also bolstered or undermined by how public officials 
view the world and how they perceive citizens and civil 
society organisations. It is this process that we unpack 
in the following section.
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Seeing the citizen(s): Public officials’ 
perceptions of citizen claims 
Worldwide, and particularly in developing countries, 
it is uncommon for public officials to come from the 
poorest and most marginalised groups. Public service 
employment and remnants of Weberian bureaucratic 
structures reinforce the distinction between officials 
and the masses; exam-based recruitment policies and 
the required educational background mean that often 
public officials come from groups with higher social 
status. A distance therefore exists between public 
officials’ lived experiences and many of the citizens 
claiming responsiveness. Key to reducing this distance 
are the degree to which officials perceive citizens’ 
claims to be legitimate, how credible the claims-makers 
are, and the trust that exists between public officials 
and citizens.
Legitimacy of claims
Whether public officials see citizen claims as legitimate 
or not is a critical dimension for both whether and how 
public officials respond. Several studies show that when 
there are laws supporting citizen participation, as well 
as processes of grievance redress, public officials are 
more likely to accept accountability claims and respond 
positively (Lodenstein et al. 2016). Such legitimacy has 
several dimensions that may be connected to whether 
existing laws and rules support citizen oversight, and 
to how public officials perceive citizens (possibly as 
trespassers) in situations where explicit, formally 
established channels for citizen participation do not 
exist (Mosquera, Zapata, Lee, Arango and Varela 2001).
In our interviews with reformist public officials, we 
noticed that the legitimacy of the demand was less 
in question when the content of claims was based 
on existing rights as provided by law or policy. Yet, 
before public officials could respond, they still had to 
verify whether the demands were valid. Legitimacy, 
however, became an issue when demands were new 
and therefore not sanctioned by law. In such cases, 
perceptions about the legitimacy of the demand tended 
to be based on widespread social understandings of the 
social contract, or on the underpinning moral economy. 
The perception of public officials regarding the claim 
then takes on greater significance: their challenge was 
to ensure that they had the right information to make a 
judgement on whether demands were genuine or were 
based on vested interests. Over time reformists seem to 
develop multiple channels of information to help them 
make such judgements.
Credibility of claim-making civil 
society organisations
Corroborating the literature on state–civil society 
relations (Gurza Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello 2005), 
the reformist public officials we interviewed also 
highlighted the importance of the representativeness 
and the credibility of claim-making civil society 
organisations. Key factors are whether public officials 
see these organisations as impartial or politically 
aligned (particularly if aligned with opposition parties); 
whether they are seen as having a genuine concern; 
and how broad their membership is (that is, how many 
citizens they truly represent).
Further, accountability literature tends to treat 
claim-making groups either as homogeneous or 
disaggregated across oversimplified class-based lines 
(for instance, the elite versus the poor). In reality, there 
are often cleavages within the poor, along religious, 
ethnic, racial and geographic lines. Caught between 
competing demands from within these groups, public 
officials must be constantly aware of these cleavages, 
as our interviews with reformists revealed. In cases of 
divided communities, every decision has to be carefully 
justified, and public officials have the extra challenge of 
making sure that they are either supporting the ‘right’ 
side, or making a decision that cannot be construed as 
overly partial to one group over another. 
Trust between public officials and 
citizens
The relationships between state officials and citizens 
also play a role in how public officials perceive social 
groups. There is now a large body of literature on 
the importance of trust-building between states and 
societies for developmental outcomes. Most  
of the reformists recognised the importance of  
In our interviews with reformist public officials, we noticed that the legitimacy 
of the demand was less in question when the content of claims was based on 
existing rights as provided by law or policy. 
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If convinced about the need  to respond, public officials must then resist the 
other competing pressures – organisational, professional and elite – that 
might work against them. Reformists navigate these complex pressures using 
what we call ‘bureaucraft’ – the bureaucratic equivalent of statecraft.
trust-building, through both formal and informal 
channels, and spent resources and capital to 
develop these channels to get a sense of what was 
happening on the ground. Responsiveness was also 
viewed as a means of generating trust, enabling 
the public official to work more effectively in the 
long run. Responsiveness is often the first step in 
a virtuous cycle in which citizens become more 
cooperative and then become emboldened to make 
further demands. Reformists recognised that trust-
building is an incremental process involving many 
small steps.
Using ‘bureaucraft’ to navigate 
within the system
If convinced about the need to respond, public officials 
must then resist the other competing pressures – 
organisational, professional and elite – that might 
work against them. Reformists navigate these complex 
pressures using what we call ‘bureaucraft’ – the 
bureaucratic equivalent of statecraft. A key challenge 
in their everyday work is to convince colleagues and 
other actors within their bureaucracies to make allies 
of actors both outside the state and within. Reformists 
attempt to mobilise and empower colleagues to 
collectively reform the system and make it more 
responsive. In fact, creating and maintaining a critical 
mass of reform-oriented public officials is key to 
collective action within the bureaucracy.
Many of the challenges public officials face when 
mobilising colleagues for collective action are similar 
to those faced by citizens when collectivising for 
social action. Colleagues might lack capacity or full 
information about policies that they are expected 
to implement, or may be risk-averse, or might even 
lack a moral compass. Reformists use different ways 
to overcome challenges of insufficient capacity. For 
instance, at times colleagues might be unwilling 
to listen to people’s complaints or promote citizen 
engagement either because official standards for 
public service are too high or there is little capacity 
to deliver. In these cases, reformists can create a 
‘minimum’ service standard set at ‘achievable levels’ 
and communicated to the public, so that they would 
not have to ‘wait until we are ready’. Other times, 
reformists use intrinsic sources of motivation, such 
as junior officials pitching innovative ideas for state 
responsiveness as if they were created by their 
superiors (who might even be against such ideas) 
knowing that the superiors will be attracted by the 
possibility of later taking credit and getting recognition 
at higher levels of the bureaucracy. Often the key is 
persuasion, with reformists identifying the responsible 
individual inside the organization, understanding their 
interests and positioning on a certain issue, in order to 
develop arguments that will be compelling.
It seems that technology has helped these reformists. 
As recent research (Peixoto and Fox 2016) has pointed 
out, ICT-enabled citizen voice leads to government 
responsiveness only when public officials already 
care to respond. When citizens email and send text 
messages directly to reformists, public officials can 
use them as real-time alerts and supporting evidence 
to persuade colleagues to respond. In addition, many 
reformists are not only alert to recognising problems 
faced by communities, but also to raising them pro-
actively in organisational discussions, particularly 
when citizens are afraid of reprisals for demanding 
accountability. Finally, being politically aware is also a 
crucial element of bureaucraft. Reformists need to be 
mindful of which battles to pick, of whether persuasion 
is likely to work, and how much political and social 
capital to invest in each instance.
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Conclusions 
Whether public officials respond to citizen demands 
depends on several sources of pressure upon them 
including organisational, professional, elites and 
citizens. With respect to citizens, the key to whether 
demands translate into effective pressure is the way in 
which public officials perceive citizens and their claims: 
the legitimacy of their claims; the credibility of who 
makes the claims; and the level of trust between public 
officials and citizens. In conversations with reform-
minded public officials, we found the following:
• Regarding legitimacy, there is a higher likelihood of 
eliciting responsiveness from public officials if claims 
relate to existing entitlements in law or policy, as 
well as if claims are broad and inclusive, rather than 
narrow.
• Ensuring that civil society organisations are neutral 
in respect to political parties might strengthen 
their credibility. Also, the degree to which they 
genuinely represent marginalised groups allows 
for perceptive public officials to take them more 
seriously.
• Engagement with citizens can transform public 
officials’ perceptions of citizens’ claims and their 
legitimacy. Through repeated interactions that 
demonstrate integrity, they can earn each other’s 
trust. If this trust exists, public officials will be more 
willing to ‘stick their neck out’ for citizens. 
When public officials are motivated to be responsive, 
they must engage in delicate navigation of reluctance 
and resistance within their own organisations. 
Over time, they learn better strategies for building 
willingness to respond among their peers, superiors 
and subordinates, and for mobilising this into action – 
mastering the art of ‘bureaucraft’.
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